**The NREGA and the Naxalites: A Mobilization - Government Policy Nexus in India**

**Appendix**

**Part A. Front organizations, keyword selection**

The list of front organizations of different Naxalite factions, collected from official documents, newspaper articles, and movements’ declarations:

Revolutionary Writers Association, Jana Natya Mandali, Telangana Praja Front, Democratic Students Union, Krantikari Kisan Committee, Krantikari Buddhijivi Sangh, Mazdoor Kisan Sangram Samiti, Nari Mukti Sangh, Revolutionary Democratic Front, Indian Association of People’s Lawyers, Adivasi Bal Sangham, Chetana Natya Mandali, Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangh, Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangh, Delhi General Mazdoor Front, Vikalp , Forum Against War on People, Committee for Release of Political Prisoners, People’s Democratic Front of India, Mehanatkash Mazdoor Morcha, Gujarat Working Class Wing, Krantikari Kamdar Sanghthan, Naujawan Bharat Sabha, Jagrook Chhatra Morcha, Mahila Mukti Morcha, Bharat Naujawan Sabha, Jharkhand Avon, Jharkhand Mukti Manch, Jharkhand Liberation Front, Krantikari Budhijivi Sangh, Mazdoor Sangathan Samiti, Operation Green Hunt Virodhi Nagrik Manch, Visthapan Virodhi Jan Vikas Andolan, Karnataka Komu Sauharda Vedike, Revolutionary People’s Front, Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Majdoor Sanghatana, Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sanghatana, Virodhi Sanskritik Chalwal, Vidarbha, Indian Association of People’s Lawyer, Committee Against Violence on Women, Kabir Kala Manch, Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh, Daman Pratirodh Manch, Lok Sangram Manch, Operation Green Hunt Virodhi Jamhoori Manch, Bharatiya Kisan Union/E- Krantikari, Krantikari Pendu Mazdoor Union, Nari Mukti Manch, Anti-Imperialist Movement, Indian Association for People’s Lawyers, Students Uprising Movement for Social Welfare, Federation against Internal Repression, Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners, Progressive Students Forum, Gan Pratirodh Manch, Mazdoor Krishak Sangram Samity, Revolutionary Youth League, Matangini Mahila Samiti, Police-e-Santrash Birodhi Janasadharaner Committee, United Students Democratic Front, Revolutionary Youth Association, Telangana Asanghatitha Karmika Samkhya, Telangana Vidyarthi Vedika, Telangana Vidyarthi Sangham, Adivasi Students Union, Telangana Raithanga Samithi, Tudum Debba, Praja Kala Mandali, Telangana Democratic Front, Forum Against Hindu Fascism Offensive, Civil Liberties Committee, Amarula Bandhu Mithrula Sangham, Chaitanya Mahila Sangham, Radical Youth League, Rythu Coolie Sangham, Radical Students Union, Singareni Karmika Samakya, Viplava Karmika Samakhya, Porattam Kerala, Ayyankali pada Kerala, Njattuvela Kerala, All India Revolutionary Students Federation, Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan, Chetna Natya Manch, Niyamgiri Suraksha Samiti, All India Students Association, All India Agricultural and Rural Labour Association, All India Peasants’ Coordination Committee, All India Central Council of Trade Unions, All India Progressive Women’s Association, Autonomous State Demand Committee, All India Construction Workers Federation, All India Kisan Mahasabha, All Bengal Student Association, All India Agricultural Labourers Association, All India Kisan Sanghars Samiti

The keyword list also covers “Peoples War” and “MCC” groups.

**Part B. Instrumental Variable Analysis in the NREGA Models**

**Section B. 1. Empirical Support for the Exclusion Restriction**

Chart, scatter chart

Description automatically generated

Figure 4: Association of the water deficit with the instrument for the relevant time range

**Section B. 2. Post-estimation results of IV-2sls models**

Post-estimation results for Model 4 in the baseline are as follows. Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is 35.289, with strongly significant Chi-square test results (0.000), showing that the model is not under-identified. For the weak identification test, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 400.490, and the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (59.188) is much higher than the threshold of 10% maximal IV size for the Stock-Yogo weak ID test (16.38). The Hansen J statistic is another metric testing over-identification, and one can safely reject this risk with a strongly significant p-value (0.000). The equation is exactly identified. Further, in the first stage of regression, the instrument predicts the independent variable of interest with a strongly significant p-value at 0.01 and has a positive coefficient, in support of the theoretical justification in this study. These results are very similar to other models in Table 2.

**Part C. Robustness Checks**

**Section C. 1. The NREGA models**

Table C. Panel A: Robustness checks for the NREGA models

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: | Persondays\_NREGA\_overpop | | | | Exp\_NREGA  \_overpop | log\_Persondays  \_pop |
|  | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| L.log\_Naxal | 855.035\*\*\* | 9,102.937\* | 563.569\*\*\* | 720.638\*\*\* | 1.159\*\*\* | 0.401\*\* |
|  | (286.033) | (4,939.465) | (165.926) | (218.917) | (0.380) | (0.162) |
| L.Persondays\_NREGA\_overpop |  |  | 0.806\*\*\* | 0.809\*\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.020) | (0.021) |  |  |
| L.Persondays\_overpop\_splag |  |  | -0.066\*\* | -0.072\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  | (0.031) | (0.032) |  |  |
| L.Naxal\_splag |  |  |  | -42.461\*\* |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (19.712) |  |  |
| L.percapitacurrentprices1000inrs | 1.480 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (3.104) |  |  |  |  |  |
| L.primarysectorcurrentsharespercen | -9.251\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (4.393) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Fixed effect | State | District | State | State | State | State |
| Time range | 2008-2014 | 2006-2014 | 2006-2014 | 2006-2014 | 2006-2014 | 2006-2014 |
| Observations | 3,304 | 4,269 | 3,781 | 3,781 | 4,270 | 4,270 |
| All results are derived by instrumental variable analysis (IV-2SLS) with log\_ruralviolentprotest. All control variables in the main document are included in the models. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). Time trends (yearly) are controlled for all models. The time range for all models is 2006-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags (with “L”) and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. | | | | | | |

Table C.1 Panel B: Robustness checks for the NREGA models

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: | Persondays\_NREGA\_overpop | | | | | | |
|  | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| L.log\_violent\_Naxal | 1,300.487\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | (359.893) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| L.log\_non\_violent\_Naxal |  | 2,912.772\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | (793.022) |  |  |  |  |  |
| L.log\_rural\_Naxal |  |  | 1,622.420\*\*\* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | (487.784) |  |  |  |  |
| L.log\_urban\_Naxal |  |  |  | 1,611.178\*\*\* |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | (416.567) |  |  |  |
| L.log\_Naxal |  |  |  |  | 757.276\*\*\* | 418.169\*\*\* | 195.600\*\* |
|  |  |  |  |  | (231.819) | (153.218) | (97.613) |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| The time lag of the instrument | Four years | Four years | Four years | Four years | Three years | Two years | One year |
| Observations | 4,270 | 4,270 | 4,270 | 4,270 | 4,270 | 4,270 | 4,270 |
| All results are derived by instrumental variable analysis (IV-2SLS) with log\_ruralviolentprotest. All control variables in the main document are included in the models. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and time trends (yearly) are controlled for all models. The time range for all models is 2006-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags (with “L”) and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. | | | | | | | |

**Section C. 2. Mobilization models**

Table C.2 Panel A: Robustness checks for the Naxalite models

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: | log\_Naxal | | Naxal\_dummy | |
|  | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 |
| L.Exp\_NREGA\_overpop | 0.028\*\* |  |  | 0.058\*\* |
|  | (0.012) |  |  | (0.023) |
| L.Persondays\_overpop\_splag |  | 0.000\*\* |  |  |
|  |  | (0.000) |  |  |
| L.Persondays\_NREGA\_overpop |  |  | 0.000\*\*\* |  |
|  |  |  | (0.000) |  |
| Model specification | Negative binomial | Negative binomial | Logistic regression | Logistic regression |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | -1.169\* | -1.027 | -1.192 | -1.297 |
|  | (0.700) | (0.704) | (1.194) | (1.193) |
| lnalpha | -85,454.109 | -48,165.757 |  |  |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,669 | 3,669 | 3,627 | 3,627 |
| All control variables in the main document are included in the models. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and time trends (yearly) are controlled. The time range for all models is 2007-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags (with “L”) and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. | | | | |

*Mobilization models* ***-*** *Instrumental Variable Analysis*

I employed another IV2sls analysis for the mobilization models. Since there is no preexisting package in STATA (to my knowledge) for negative binomial panel data analysis within IV2sls regressions, I manually ran the first stage, predicted the outcome variable, and regressed the second stage on the predicted variable. As the instrumental variable, the model exploits another NREGA-related factor—the number of beneficiary households from non-scheduled castes and tribes (divided by population)—since the Naxalites have often been associated with scheduled castes and tribes due to discrimination-like grievances of people from the lower castes in rural India. Therefore, the instrument is programmatically associated with the NREGA and expected to be exogenous to the Naxalites’ mobilization. While Model 25 and Model 26 show the first and second-stage results for the negative binomial IV2sls analysis, Model 27 and Model 28 run a logistic IV2sls regression to present the robustness of the results. First-stage regressions seem to predict the NREGA accurately, and the NREGA has positive coefficients with strongly significant p-values (at 0.01 and 0.05, respectively) in both second-stage models. Although the coefficients shrink within IV2sls models, they are still consistent with the second hypothesis of this research—that the NREGA has a mobilizing effect on the Naxalites.

Table C.2 Panel B: Robustness checks for the Naxalite models

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: | Persondays\_NREGA  \_overpop | log\_Naxal | Persondays\_NREGA  \_overpop | Naxal\_dummy |
|  | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 |
| L.Persondays\_NREGA\_overpop |  | 0.000\*\*\* |  | 0.000\*\* |
|  |  | (0.000) |  | (0.000) |
| L.NREGAfor\_nonSCST (instrument) | 84.390\*\*\* |  | 83.898\*\*\* |  |
|  | (4.281) |  | (2.573) |  |
| Model stage | First | Second | First | Second |
| Model specification | Negative binomial IV2sls | | Logistic IV2sls | |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | 1,034.555\*\*\* | -1.064 | 1,921.600\*\*\* | 1.471\*\*\* |
|  | (377.952) | (0.689) | (359.678) | (0.529) |
| Ln alpha |  | -33,413.818 |  |  |
|  |  | (0.000) |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,676 | 3,669 | 3,634 | 3,634 |
| All control variables in the main document are included in the models. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and time trends (yearly) are controlled. The time range for all models is 2007-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags (with “L”) and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. | | | | |

**Part D. Substitution**

This section presents an analysis of the compensation in India and whether the NREGA is used to compensate the SEZ-led land dispossessions. The project-level SEZ data is taken from the Ministry of Commerce & Industry (publicly available in the official documents) and is the second key variable in this study. I manually extracted the officially notified SEZ area for each district and year by subtracting the de-notified area. The final list includes the total notified SEZ area measured in hectares. I also consider the SEZ denotifications, a binary variable indicating any occurrences of denotification in the district during any given year. Model 29 tests whether the decision makers distributed more NREGA provisions to districts with larger SEZ areas. Accordingly, Model 30 further examines whether they revoked this generosity when the SEZ project was de-notified. Finally, Model 31 tests whether the Indian governments increased the SEZ areas in districts that were allocated more NREGA provisions.

The three coefficients obtained in the three models are all strongly significant (with a p-value of 0.01). However, the coefficient of the SEZ area is very low in Model 29. Ten thousand hectares of additional SEZ area results in two additional NREGA person-days, distributed per 1,000 rural people. Nevertheless, its small standard error supports its effectiveness in the positive direction, as in the negative impact of the SEZ denotifications in Model 30. Model 31 provides further evidence for the reverse order of the same relationship with the positive coefficient of the NREGA provision. According to the results of these three models, one can safely argue that the implementation of the SEZ projects and the distribution of the NREGA provisions are positively associated; therefore, the NREGA and land rights are negatively related. This result is intriguing, as this association occurs despite the diverging impacts of the NREGA and the SEZs on Naxalite mobilization. I also replicated these three models with the expenditure version of the NREGA variable in order to prove the robustness of the findings.

Table D.1: Substitution

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: | Persondays\_NREGA\_overpop | | SEZ\_area |
|  | 29 | 30 | 31 |
|  |  |  |  |
| L.Persondays\_NREGA\_overpop |  |  | 0.153\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.042) |
| L.SEZ\_area | 0.000\*\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.000) |  |  |
| L.SEZ\_denotification |  | -1.445\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.394) |  |
| L.log\_Naxal | 1.167\*\*\* | 1.154\*\*\* | 0.296\*\* |
|  | (0.333) | (0.332) | (0.149) |
| Control variables | Same as the baseline | Same as the baseline | rural\_ratio, forest\_ratio, worker\_ratio, st\_pop\_ratio, sc\_pop\_ratio, cropped\_ratio, total\_light\_cal\_ |
| Ln alpha |  |  | 2.920\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.132) |
| Constant |  |  | 30.180\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (3.658) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,787 | 3,787 | 3,849 |
| The first two models in the table share the same structure and control variable list as Model 4. Therefore, while Model 5 and Model 6 are based on IV-2sls analysis, Model 7 depends on negative binomial regression. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and time trends (yearly) are controlled for all models. The time range for all models is 2007-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags (with “L”) and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. | | | |

Table D.2: Robustness checks for substitution models

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Dependent variable: | Exp\_NREGA\_overpop | | SEZ\_area |
|  | 32 | 33 | 34 |
|  |  |  |  |
| L.Persondays\_NREGA\_overpop |  |  | 0.187\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.041) |
| L.SEZ\_area | 0.000\*\* |  |  |
|  | (0.000) |  |  |
| L.SEZ\_denotification |  | -1.434\*\*\* |  |
|  |  | (0.442) |  |
| L.log\_Naxal | 1.050\*\*\* | 1.028\*\*\* | 0.201 |
|  | (0.393) | (0.390) | (0.138) |
| Control variables | Same as the baseline | Same as the baseline | rural\_ratio, forest\_ratio, worker\_ratio, st\_pop\_ratio, sc\_pop\_ratio, cropped\_ratio, total\_light\_cal\_ |
| Ln alpha |  |  | 30.973\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (3.528) |
| Constant |  |  | 2.906\*\*\* |
|  |  |  | (0.133) |
|  |  |  |  |
| Observations | 3,787 | 3,787 | 3,849 |
| The first two models in the table share the same structure and control variable list as Model 4. Therefore, while Model 32 and Model 33 are based on IV-2sls analysis, Model 34 depends on negative binomial regression. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and time trends (yearly) are controlled for all models. The time range for all models is 2007-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags (with “L”) and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. | | | |

**Part E. Links from GLOCON and Liberation journal**

Using the keywords “NREGA” and “protest,” I conducted a search on the webpage of the Liberation journal and listed the relevant contents of the most related articles. The “Type” column indicates whether the article presents the content as a raised demand, simply reports a demand, or directs criticism.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Type** | **Content** |
| Demand | Extend NREGA to urban areas. Bring a separate legislation for agricultural labour. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2011/05/aicctus-may-day-call> |
| Report | Hundreds of agricultural workers and peasants from Punjab were participating in the March, who were jailed in large numbers last year for agitating for homestead land and NREGA jobs. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2011/05/country-wide-peoples-rights-rallies-demand-check-prices-give-us-jobs-carry-out> |
| Report | CPI(ML) held a large rally which marched from Bhubaneswar Railway Station to the State Assembly on 27 March. People from 22 districts of Odisha were present in the rally. Apart from highlighting mass concerns like price rise, BPL, PDS and NREGA, the rally called for an immediate end to Operation Green Hunt, release of all political prisoners, withdrawal of concessions granted to big companies like Posco, Vedanta, Tata and nationalization of the entire mineral sector. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2020/05/initiatives-in-tamil-nadu-during-lockdown> |
| Report | The days to come call for militant mobilisations (as AIALA has launched for implementation of the NREGA) to demand that Governments in question deliver on the question of unorganised workers’ rights – from registration of Delhi construction workers in the Welfare Fund to implementation of the Bima Yojana scheme to cover all BPL households. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/04/contemporary-working-class-issues-and-struggles> |
| Criticism | For the last four years the CPI(M) has been actively associated with a government at the Centre. How does the CPI(M) describe its association? The CPI(M) is a signatory to the Common Minimum Programme which is the ruling UPA’s commonly drafted and commonly monitored manifesto of governance. Yet the CPI(M) would have us believe that its association with the government is only selective. In fact while it claims credit for legislations on rural employment guarantee (will the CPI(M) tell us if it has been instrumental for the NREGA, why the rural poor in CPI(M)-ruled states have not even got ten days’ employment a year instead of the assured 100 days?), right to information and prevention of domestic violence, and for the presumed slowing down of reforms, it blames the Congress for everything neo-liberal and pro-imperialist in UPA policies! Whatever may be the CPI(M)’s formula for apportioning credit and blame, the fact remains that the CPI(M) cannot hide its actual status as a participant and major stakeholder in the UPA government. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/03/draft-political-resolution-cpims-19th-congress> |
| Report | The major demands are to institute a CBI inquiry into the rampant corruption and huge misappropriation of funds under the NREGA in the light of recent CAG draft report and to allocate at least Rs. 50,000 Crores for the NREGA in the budget proposals to be presented in Parliament. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/03/aiala-nation-wide-protest> |
| Report and criticism | In all discussions and debates going on in view of the completion of two years of NREGA’s implementation and the CAG Report, there is a mysterious silence on the question of why Governments crossed all limits of constitutional propriety and laws to brutally implement the pro-corporate SEZ Act 2005 while the NREG Act meant to serve the poor has been left to die a silent death... It is in this light that AIALA has demanded an allocation of Rs. 50000 crore for NREGA in the coming budget. Further AIALA has demanded that the DM and DDC should be made accountable for NREGA implementation and there must be statutory provisions for regulating them in this respect. Only by confronting the power structure, by an offensive against its pro-rich policies, can the rights of the poor be protected and NREGA saved.... It is not necessary to talk about the neo-liberal anti-NREGA lobby because their class character is well-known. But those intellectuals, leaders and parties among NREGA supporters who want to conceal its failure or want to limit it to administrative apathy or weakness of infrastructure etc, are actually trying to conceal the real face of the anti-poor system in the country. The failure of NREGA should be understood not in terms of neo-liberal policies alone but should be situated in the history of failure of pro-poor laws and schemes in the country. In fact, left to the ruling classes and governments are concerned, NREGA is all set to meet the same fate as that of zamindari abolition, land reform, garibi hatao, 20-point programme, mass education campaigns etc. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/03/two-years-nrega-great-betrayal-poor> |
| Report | Similar block-level agitations were organised by our party in Baburhat in Jalpaiguri, Naihati (Rural), Habra Block-2 and Gaighata of North 24 Parganas. In Dhanekhali-Belmudi area more than 700 agriculture labourers closed the panchayat office and then blocked the main road for several hours. The BDO-SDO and police officials came to the spot and asked our comrades to open the panchayat office and clear the road-block. The police and the administration had to beat a retreat seeing the mood of the agitating masses. The Panchayat Pradhan was forced to declare 100 days work to 8000 people under NREGA. Ration-rage got intermingled with the movements for 100 days work under NREGA. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2007/11/food-movement-2007-west-bengal> |
| Report | Resolutions were passed to intensify the struggle for agricultural Minimum Wage to be raised to Rs. 100 and NREGA wages to Rs. 200 a day. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/09/nationwide-campaign-23-july-20-august> |
| Report | It was a completely unusual scene for Chikka Panakal Panchayat office in Gangavati taluk which was otherwise calm and serene. In spite of having prior information, panchayat officials were taken aback seeing unexpectedly large number of people numbering more than 250 picketing the office on various issues related to implementation of NREGA. The people gathered in large numbers under the banner of AIALA and CPIML in spite of attempts by various power groups of various parties to sabotage the mobilization. In fact, other parties and local power brokers did not want a revolutionary force to emerge at panchayat level to challenge them. But, the demo on 11 July was successful and the panchayat officials have promised to fulfill the demands of the people. The demo was addressed by Comrades Bharadwaj, SCM, Uma Shankar, Taluk Secretary of CPI(ML), Mallikarjuna of AIALA and Lingan Gowda Patil, the local organizer. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/08/panchayat-level-protest-nrega> |
| Report | The CPI(ML) team demanded that work be provided under NREGA for the workers, measures be taken to curb the pollution, arrested villagers be released, and local villagers too be provided employment in the factory. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/06/reports-chhattisgarh> |
| Demand | ...round the year employment and Rs.200/- daily wage to all poor under NREGA… |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/03/nitishs-vikas-yatra-gimmick> |
| Report | In particular, there have been sustained and militant struggles against the widespread corruption in schemes like PDS and NREGA. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/10/jharkhand-diary> |
| Demand | Intensify local struggles on basic issues like land, wages (including cases of non-payment/delayed/partial payment under NREGA), social dignity, development (fulfilment of people’s basic development needs and aspirations)… |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/10/implementation-ccs-july-28-call> |
| Report | In Orissa, more than CPI(ML) activists rallied in front of Orissa Assembly on CM Martyrdom Day, July 28, demanding to withdraw Vedanta University Bill which would give precious agricultural land to the MNC Vedanta at the cost of peasants’ livelihoods. A protest meeting was also held on the same day in front of Rayagada District Collector office on the issue of land and NREGA which was attended by around 1000 activists. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/09/protest-against-vedanta-university-bill> |
| Report | A protest against poor implementation of NREGA was organised on 12 August in Vadipatti block of Madhurai district. AIALA and AIPWA carried out signature campaign in 10 villages in the area demanding segregation of rural areas from the town panchayat and demanding implementation of NREGA and welfare schemes in Town panchayats too. The panchayats tried to bribe or threaten workers from participating: one panchayat hiked wages from about Rs. 40 to Rs. 75 urging the people not to protest, another declared compulsory work on the day of protest threatening people with loss of jobs if they fail to turn up. More than 200 people, mainly women, participated and marched from the BDO to the Revenue Inspector’s office. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/09/madurai-protest-against-illegalities-nrega> |
| Report | A campaign and people’s hearing was conducted on the issues of corruption in NREGA and Rs 1.19 lakh bribe taken by the Birni BDO and JE, after which an FIR was filed. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2016/12/resisting-assaults-its-basic-character> |
| Report | These incidents show that there is an undeclared emergency in Ghazipur district. The CPI(ML) here has taken up issues of corruption in NREGA and mid-day meal schemes… |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2010/04/draconian-laws-against-cpiml-activists-ghazipur> |
| Demand | NREGA cards for all labourers and extension of NREGA to 200 days, as well as compulsory work under NREGA for at least one woman from every family… |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/07/protests-against-punjab-crackdown-0> |
| Report | MGNREGA, though touted as the world’s biggest employment guarantee programme, has clearly failed to make any major dent in rural poverty and unemployment, let alone create any positive push to raise the low level of rural wages. AIALA had taken impressive initiatives in the initial phase when NREGA was being launched, and it is important to sustain the momentum with planned and systematic intervention to take up NREGA-related struggles. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2013/03/draft-9th-party-congress-agrarian-and-other-rural-struggles> |
| Report | All India Agricultural Labourers’ Association (AIALA) organized a panchayat-level demonstration in Tamil Nadu (March 5-15) demanding inclusion in BPL list, work under MGNREGA, Rs.200 daily wages under MGNREGA, homestead land and patta. |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2010/04/update-aiala-demo-tamilnadu> |
| Report | Later an AIPWA delegation also met the CM Ashok Gahlaut and presented their list of demands which include extending NREGA to all the districts and guaranteeing 50 percent employment for women with minimum wage at Rs.200/8hr, NREGA to be extended to town areas and urban centres also with 50 percent jobs for women... |
|  | <https://cpiml.net/liberation/2010/04/international-womens-day-centenary-events> |